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FEDERAL TAX CASES UPON APPEAL:
THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE DOBSON RULE
WARREN F. WATTLES
Certain of the principles governing the scope of the review of federal
tax cases in the higher federal courts have changed significantly during the
last twenty years. The more obvious changes have been effected by act of
Congress or by decision of the Supreme Court. Upon occasion an intermediate appellate court, a United States Circuit Court of Appeals, has
seemed to pay scarcely more than lip-service to the principles supposed
to guide it. At times the guiding principle itself has been imperfect and
its application has produced anomalous results. Sometimes the intermediate court is at fault.
The search for principles which, as far as humanly possible, would
insure perfection of decision upon appeal in federal tax cases has followed
a tortuous course in recent years. In one respect it has gone almost full
circle during the last two decades. In the process many federal tax
cases have from the point of view of perfect justice been decided incorrectly upon appeal, either through affirmance or through reversal of the
decision below. Thus a case decided one way upon appeal in recent
years very probably, sometimes almost certainly, would have been decided
in exactly opposite fashion by the same court a few years before, and
this though no significant change of substantive law occurred in the
meantime. This vagary of decision has produced confusion and has been
particularly noticeable in some of the decisions of the federal appellate
courts in cases which came to them upon appeal from the Tax Court of
the United States, known from 1924 to October 21, 1942, as the United
States Board of Tax Appeals. It is the purpose of this article to discuss
an important phase of the evolution of principles governing the scope of
the review of federal tax cases by the higher federal courts, including
changes in those principles in recent years.
Taxes have ever been the life-blood of government. Without revenue
government perishes, and taxes are the great source of public revenue.
Hence from motives of self-preservation governments have traditionally
[ 333 1
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collected their revenue first, under some pattern of exaction, and thereafter have heard the complaint of the taxpayer and made restitution where
the latter seemed proper.' Thus for more than a century taxpayers
could not obtain a judicial determination of their liability for federal
taxes in any court of this country, save in most rare and exceptional
circumstances, until after they had paid their tax, filed claim for refund
with the proper authorities, and waited a certain period of time; then
they might file suit. The suit would lie either in the United States District
Court or in the Court of Claims after that court was established. 2
Such a system of corrective justice left much to be desired. The
payment of a tax not owed, as a condition to litigating one's liability.
was a serious matter and even ruined some taxpayers and some businesses. In this setting Congress passed the Revenue Act of 19243 establishing a Board of Tax Appeals as "an independent agency in the executive
branch of the government," '4 the members of the Board to be appointed
by the President, by and with the consent of the Senate, to hear federal
income and estate tax cases, upon petition by the taxpayer, in instances
where the taxpayer wished to litigate his liability before making payment. The statute provided that either party, upon losing before the
Board, might bring a proceeding in court, the Government to collect the
amount of the deficiency disallowed by the Board, the taxpayer to
recover any amounts paid in pursuance of a decision by the Board. Thus
proceedings before the Board, under the Revenue Act of 1924, were somewhat experimental in nature and tentative in result.:,
'Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U. S. 498, 509. 52 Sup. Ct. 260, 263,
76 L. Ed. 422, 429 (1932) ; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S.589, 593 n.5, 51 Sup.
Ct. 608, 610, 75 L. Ed. 1289, 1295 (1931); Cheatham v. United States, 92 U. S. 85,
89, 23 L. Ed. 561 (1875) ; see also State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S.575, 613-614,
23 L. Ed. 663, 673 (1875).
236 STAT. 1091, 1100 (1911), as amended, 28 U. S. C. §§41(1), 105 (1946), as
, H. R 3214, 28 U. S. C
revised by Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 STAT. §§1331, 1340, 1345, 1346, 1396 (6 Coxo. R~c. SERV.), effective Sept. 1, 1948; 36
STAT. 1136 (1911), as amended, 28 U. S. C. §250(1) (1946), as revised by Act of
H. R. 3214, 28 U. S. C. 11491 (6 CONG. REC.
June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 STAT. -.
SERV.), effective Sept. 1, 1948.
343 STAT. 253-355.

'Revenue Act of 1924, §900(k), 43 STAT. 338 (1924).
'In Blair v. Curran, 24 F.2d 390, 392 (C. C. A. 1st 1928), the court described
them thus: "The hearing before the Board was at that time [under the 1924 Act]
little more than a preliminary skirmish, a run for luck. For either party, if dissatisfied with the decision, could bring a court action and try the matter de novo
the Board's findings being prima facie evidence against the losing party."
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The Revenue Act of 19266 gave greater status to decisions of the
Board of Tax Appeals rendered in cases heard after the passage of that
Act. A trial de novo could no longer be obtained in the Court of Claims
or in a district court, by a proceeding instituted there, after the decision
by the Board. 7 The aggrieved party's only remedy was by appeal to
the circuit court of appeals or to the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia, 8 whose judgment in turn was subject to review by the Supreme
Court of the United States upon certiorari in the manner provided in the
Judicial Code.
The power of the intermediate federal court, i.e., of the circuit court
of appeals or the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, to review decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals was thus defined by the
1926 Act: 9
"Upon such review, such courts shall have power to affirm or,
if the decision of the Board is not in accordance with law, to
modify or to reverse the decision of the Board, with or without
remanding the case for a rehearing, as justice may require."'3o

044 STAT. 9-131.

"The earlier remedy of a de novo proceeding was preserved in cases in which
the hearing had been held but the Board did not decide the issue until after the
passage of the Act of 1926. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716,
727-728, 49 Sup. Ct. 499, 503, 73 L. Ed. 918, 927 (1929).
'The review in the case of an individual was by the circuit court of appeals for
the circuit whereof he was an inhabitant, or, if not an inhabitant of any circuit, then
by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. The review in the case of
an association or a corporation or of an estate or trust was by the circuit in which
was located the office of the collector to whom such person made the return, or, in
case such person made no return, then by the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia. Revenue Act of 1926, §§1001, 1002, 44 STAT. 109, 110 (1926).
"§1003(b), 44 STAT. 110 (1926).
"0 The power of the circuit courts of appeals to review decisions of United States
district courts is found in Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 STAT. - , H. R. 3214, 28
U. S. C. §1291 (6 CONG. REc. SERv.), effective Sept. 1, 1948, as follows:
"The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions
of the district courts of the United States, the District Court for the Territory
of Alaska, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone,
and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review
may be had in the Supreme Court."
Cf. 28 U. S. C. §§225, 226 (1946).
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The language just quoted was carried forward without change into
the Internal Revenue Code when that was adopted on February 10, 1939,
and remains in the Internal Revenue Code today."1 Meantime the
appellate courts have variously interpreted and exercised their power of
review of decisions of the Tax Court, the same court upon some occasions
interpreting its power narrowly and strictly and, upon other occasions,
broadly. The results in terms of decisions-and judicial dispositions of
cases upon review-have been so divergent that, encouraged by both the
general tax bar and the Treasury, Congress at length took a hand. In
June, 1948, Congress passed and on June 25, 1948, the President signed
H. R. 3214, effective September 1, 1948, which-in addition to revising
and codifying the Judicial Code-amended Section 1141 (a) of the Internal
Revenue Code to read as follows:

1

2

"The circuit courts of appeals and the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Tax Court, except as provided
in section 1254 of title 28 of the United States Code, in the same
manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts
in civil actions tried without jury; and the judgment of any such
court shall be final, except that it shall be subject to review by the
Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari, in the manner
provided in Section 1254 of title 28 of the United States Code."
The words in italics are the important new words in Section 1141(a),
as amended, being the words added by H. R. 3214. By them the Congress
made specific what the earlier Congress intended and thought it had
clearly provided by section 1003(b) of the Revenue Act of 1926.13
Meantime the federal appellate courts had during the intervening years
reviewed many decisions of the Tax Court with perceptibly less respect
than the same courts accorded to decisions of federal district courts, and
"INT. REV. CODE §1141(c)(1).
2

Pub. L. No. 773, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., §36 (Sept. 1, 1948). Italics supplied.
"Supra p. 335. Both the House and Senate reports upon the Revenue Act of
1926 (H. R. REP. No. 1 and SEa. REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926), I. R. B.
19, 1939-1 Cum. BULL. pt. 2, 328, 359 (1939)) contain the following concerning
the procedure provided for review by the circuit courts of appeals and the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia of decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals: "The
procedure is made to conform as nearly as may be to the procedure [upon review]
in the case of an original action in a Federal district court."
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then others with greater or professedly greater respect or caution after
Dobson v. Commissioner.'4 It is scarcely surprising that the first occurred.
It is less understood that the liberality of review and of reversing Tax
Court decisions which the circuit courts of appeals practiced did much
to provoke the Dobson rule. Once that is appreciated and note taken
of the varied and inconsistent reactions of the several circuit courts of
appeals to the Dobson rule during its four years, eight months and twelve
days of life, 15 the profession may reasonably entertain some modest
expectations as to the scope of future reviews of tax cases and as to the
limitations upon the power of review which the appellate courts may
observe.
No purpose can be served now by collecting and analyzing the many
pre-Dobson cases which circuit courts of appeals decided with little
deference, whatever the rationalization of their opinion, to the decision
of the Tax Court below. More than once the reveiwing court decided
a fact question or a mixed question of fact and law, essentially as if
the appellate court were the trial court and the Tax Court but a panel
of special masters. All the federal appellate courts at various times
before Dobson v. Commissioner carefully set forth the limitations upon
their power to review fact questions and mixed questions of fact and
law.10 But they did not always observe those limitations.
14320 U. S. 489, 64 Sup. Ct. 239, 88 L. Ed. 248 (1943); see also 2 PAUL, FEDERAL
ESTATE. AND GiFT TAXATIoN 492 et. seq. (Supp. 1946) ; Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner:
The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 57 HARv. L. REv. 753 (1944); Notes, 29 CoaR.
L. Q. 515 (1944), 60 HARv. L. Rxv. 448 (1947), 61 L. Q. REv. 15 (1945).
1'rThe Supreme Court decided Dobson v. Commissioner, supra note 14, Dec. 20,
1943. The committee reports accompanying H. R. 3214 are specific that the purpose
of Sec. 36 of the Act is to overrule the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court
in the Dobson case. See also the statement of Mr. Reed of Illinois on behalf of the
House Committee, 94 CoNG. REc. 8677-8678 (June 16, 1948).
1
"Helvering v. National Groc. Co., 304 U. S.282, 295, 58 Sup. Ct. 932, 938, 82
L. Ed. 1346, 1356 (1938): "The Court of Appeals, instead of limiting its review to
ascertaining whether there was evidence to support the Board's findings and decision,
made on all the evidence, as upon a trial de novo, in effect, an independent determination of the matters which had been in issue before the Board. The court was
without power to do so"; Hulburd v. Commissioner, 296 U. S.300, 306, 56 Sup. Ct.
197, 200, 80 L. Ed. 242, 247 (1935), holding that the circuit court of appeals "was
without power to choose between conflicting inferences unless only one was possible,
or to try the case de novo"; see also Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co., 318
U. S.693, 702, 83 Sup. Ct. 843, 847, 87 L. Ed. 1086, 1091 (1943); Helvering v.
Kehoe, 309 U. S.277, 279, 60 Sup. Ct. 549, 550, 84 L. Ed. 751, 753 (1940); Helvering
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Then two years to a month after Pearl Harbor came Dobson v.
Commissioner, supra. The decision was a shock to the bar, for by it
the Supreme Court appeared to renounce-upon behalf of the circuit
courts of appeals as well as of itself-an important area of the judicial
function of reviewing decisions of the Tax Court. To be sure, the
Supreme Court was not without provocation for its strictures 17 anent
the freedom with which reviewing courts, including the Supreme Court,
had reversed well considered Tax Court decisions of fact questions and
of mixed questions of fact and law.1 8
v. Lazarus, 308 U. S. 252, 255, 60 Sup. Ct. 209, 210, 89
Colorado Natl. Bank v. Commissioner, 305 U. S. 23, 26,
L. Ed. 20, 22 (1938) ; Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U. . 63,
L. Ed. 50, 51 (1937); Old Mission Portland Cement Co. v.
294, 55 Sup. Ct. 158, 161, 79 L. Ed. 367, 371 (1934) ;

L. Ed. 226, 230 (1939)
59 Sup. Ct. 48, 49, 83
70, 58 Sup. Ct 67, 70, 82
Helvering, 293 U. S. 289,
Hartford-Empire Co. v.

Commissioner, 137 F.2d 540, 542 (C. C. A. 2nd), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 787, 64
Sup. Ct. 196, 88 L. Ed. 473 (1943); McGrew's Est. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 158,
161-162 (C. C. A. 6th 1943) ; Olin Corp. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 185, 187 (C. C. A
7th 1942) ; Gump v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 540, 543 (C. C. A. 9th 1941), cert
denied, 316 U. . 697, 62 Sup. Ct. 1292, 86 L. Ed. 1766 (1942) ; Snyder & Berman
v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 165, 168 (C. C. A. 4th 1940) ; Roerich v. Helvering, 115
F.2d 39 (App. D. C. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U. S. 700, 61 Sup. Ct. 740, 85 L. Ed. 1134
(1941); Maddas v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 548, 549 (C. C. A. 3rd 1940); Foster
v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 109, 113 (C. C. A. 1st 1940); Commissioner v. Horseshoe
L. Syndicate, 110 F.2d 748, 750 (C. C. A. 5th 1940) ; Jqnes v. Commissioner, 103
F.2d 681, 685 (C. C. A. 9th 1939) ; Continental Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 100 F.2d
101, 111 (App. D. C. 1938) ; Brush-Moore Newspapers v. Commissioner, 95 F.2d 900,
902 (C. C. A. 6th 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 615, 59 Sup. Ct. 74, 83 L. Ed. 392
(1938) ; Wiese v. Commissioner, 93 F.2d 921, 923 (C. C. A. 8th) cert. denied, 304
U. S. 562, 58 Sup. Ct. 944, 82 L. Ed. 1529 (1938); Stuart v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d
368 (C. C. A. 1st 1936) ; Southern Power & Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d
104, 105 (C. C. A. 5th 1936); Beech v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 42, 44-45 (C. C. A.
3rd 1936) ; Helvering v. Edison Securities Corp., 78 F.2d 85, 87 (C. C. A. 4th 1935) ;
Commissioner v. Hales, 76 F.2d 916 (C. C. A. 7th 1935); Wilson v. Commissioner.
76 F.2d 476, 478 (C. C. A. 10th 1935); Randolph v. Helvering, 76 F.2d 472, 476
(C. C. A. 8th 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 599, 56 Sup. Ct. 116, 80 L. Ed. 425
(1938); Patterson v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 148, 149 (C. C. A. 2nd 1930).
"Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489, 494, 64 Sup. Ct. 239, 243. 88 L Ed
248, 252 (1943): "However, even a casual survey of decisions in tax cases, now over
5,000 in number, will demonstrate that courts including this Court have not paid
the scrupulous deference to the tax laws' admonitions of finality which they have to
similar provisions in statutes relating to other tribunals ....
"sIt is noteworthy that the Court's opinion in the Dobson case was written by
Justice Jackson, whose unusual experience as General Counsel of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, as Assistant Attorney General in charee of the Tax Division of
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Attempted adherence to the Dobson rule soon taxed the talents of
the learned justices, if it did not involve the Supreme Court in inconsistencies.1 9 Nevertheless the rule was reiterated 2 o and even embellished. 21
the Department of Justice, as Solicitor General, and as Attorney General had made
him sensitive to the current of appellate court decisions, reviewing and overruling
decisions of the Tax Court. Later cases, particularly, show that his views were
shared by Justice Frankfurter, who arrived at the same conclusion by long study
and work in the field of administrative law and procedures. A motive with all the
justices may have been an apprehension of a burdensome increase in the amount of
tax litigation brought to the appellate courts as a result of World War II. See
Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489, 494, 64 Sup. Ct. 239, 243, 88 L. Ed. 248,
252 (1943): "Increase of potential tax litigation due to more taxpayers and higher
rates lends new importance to observance of statutory limitations on review of tax
decisions."
"Cf. John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner and Talbot Mills v. Commissioner, 326
U. S. 521, 533 & 536, 66 Sup. Ct. 299, 305 & 307, 90 L. Ed. 278, 285 & 287 (1946),
each of which was decided by only one tax court judge, a different judge in each
case. Substantially all of the evidentiary facts were stipulated in both cases and
the facts were substantially the same. One tax court judge decided one case for
the taxpayer; the other tax court judge decided the other case for the Commissioner.
The circuit court of appeals reversed in the one case and decided for the Commissioner; another circuit court of appeals affirmed the tax court decision for the
Commissioner. The Supreme Court in a single opinion covering both cases reversed
in the case in which the circuit of court appeals had reversed the tax court and
affirmed the other, thus affirming the two decisions of the tax court. One of the
dissenting justices commented on this as follows:
"One might entertain the view that in a close situation the Tax Court's judgment should be accepted whatever way the die were cast, although reviewing
courts might differ on the direction. But it would not follow, and in my
judgment should not, that they are powerless when the throw is in opposite
directions at the same time. . . . If the ultimate conclusion of the Tax Court
or its divisions can be made in exactly opposing ways, and must be left undisturbed, without substantial differentiating facts, or when hybrid arrangements bear tax indicia equally with marks of non-taxability, not only is the
statutory review nullified. The right of taxpayers to be treated with equal
justice before the law is denied."
"Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S.591, 607-608, 68 Sup. Ct. 715, 92 L. Ed. 673
(1948); Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280, 287, 66 Sup. Ct. 532, 535, 90 L. Ed.
670, 675 (1946); Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U. S.303, 307, 65 Sup. Ct. 652, 654,
89 L. Ed. 958, 962 (1945).
"See Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U. S.365, 384, 65 Sup. Ct. 1232,
1241, 89 L. Ed. 1670, 1682 (1945) (concurring opinion). "If the issue presents
a difficulty which it is peculiarly within the competence of the Tax Court to resolve
and that court has given a fair answer, every consideration which led to the pronouncement in the Dobson case should preclude independent re-examination of the
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The response of circuit courts of appeals to the Dobson rule was varied.
The circuit court of appeals which had been reversed in the Dobson case
soon rendered a decision which, upon grant of certiorari, might have been
made the occasion for a clarification and a sensible modification of the
Dobson doctrine. 22 But the chief counsel for the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and the Department of Justice chose not to seek certiorari in
the case.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit after a few
reversals 2 3 in cases where it had reversed the Tax Court candidly
acknowledged and sought to conform to the limitations upon its power
of review imposed by the Dobson rule. 2 4 It even affirmed a Tax Court
25
decision where it would have reversed a like decision of a district court.
In inimitably ironical language, however, which none who read might
26
miss, it paid its respects to the Dobson doctrine.
Tax Court's disposition " Italics supplied. Cf. Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U. S. 0S, 313.
65 Sup. Ct. 655, 656, 89 L. Ed. 963, 965 (1945), a suit against a Collector of Intern.l
Revenue, in which the Court significantly observed: 'This case, unlike the Weniyss
case, does not come here by way of the Tax Court. No aid can therefore be dra% n
from a prior determination by the tribunal specially entrusted with tax adjudications."
2
-Helvering v. Meredith, 140 F.2d 973 (C. C A. 9th 1944), aflirming per cllzar
on authority of the Dobson doctrine a memorandum opinion of the Tax Court vhich
held that life insurance and guaranteed annuity contracts separate in form tut simultaneously issued by an insurance company for a single consideration, without physical
examination of the insured and no matter what the age of the insured, should nut
be treated for federal tax purposes as a single investment transaction. B.a cf. Keller
v. Commissioner, 312 U S. 543, 61 Sup. Ct. 651, 85 L. Ed. 10i2 (1941); tIelverinv
v. Le Gir-e, 312 U S 5;1, 61 Sup. Ct. 646, 85 L. Ed. 996 (1941); Helvering v
Tyler, 111 F.2d 422 (C. C A. Sth 1940), afJ'd per curiamn, 312 U S 657, 61 Sup Ct
729, 85 L Ed. 1105 (1941), all to the contrary
"3Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U. S. 365, 65 Sup. Ct 1232, S9 L Ed
1670 (1945) ; Commissioner v. Bedford, 325 U. S. 283, 65 Sup Ct 1157, S9 L Ed.
1611 (1945)
2
Seifert v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 719 (C. C. A. 2nd 1946); Brooklyn Natl.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 450, 452 (C. C. A. 2nd), cert. denied, 3-9 U S 7Q.
67 Sup. Ct. 96, 91 L. Ed. 634 (1946).
2
'Brookl.n Natl. Corp. v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 450, 452 (C. C. A 2nd 194r,
. if the case were an appeal from a district court, we should have n3 alternative
but to reverse" See also Kirschenbaum v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 23, 25 (C. C A
2nd), cert. denied, 329 U. S. 726, 67 Sup. Ct. 75, 91 L. Ed. 623 (1946) ; cf. Kobnstamm
v Pcdrick, 153 F.2d 506, 508-509 (C. C. A. 2nd 1945).
"American Coast Line, Inc., v. Commissioner, 159 F2d 665, 668-669 (C. C. A
1st 1947). See also Commissioner v. Natural Carbide Corp, 167 F 2d 304, t07-08
(C. C A 2d 1948)
Italics supplied.
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"Finally, so far as concerns our review of the Tax Court, as distinct
from its own decisions as to its jurisdiction, the case seems to us
especially proper for the application of the doctrine that, even as to
matters of law unmixed with fact, we are to yield unless our conviction to the contrary is strong. . . . It is of course not our
province to fix the distribution of judicial power; least of all are
we in a position to measure the higher authority which the Tax
Court's constant occupation in its special field should give to its
rulings, as distinct from ours in our sprawling jurisdiction. We
can think of no legal question as to which we ought more readily
yield than that at bar; in that thicket of verbiage, through which we
have been forced to cut a way, it must surely be an advantage to
have been familiar with other tangles of the same general sort;
and, while it is the pleasure of Congress to express itself so
apocalyptically, we may well be grateful that we are permitted
to put our hand into those of accredited pathfinders."
Other circuit courts of appeals reacted somewhat differently. They
did not noticeably imitate the Second Circuit's reductio ad absurdum
campaign anent the Dobson doctrine. Instead they pursued the even
tenor of their ways, reversing the Tax Court when they believed the
inhibitions of the Dobson doctrine not too trammeling and the occasion
appropriate. Some continued to reverse the Tax Court with considerable
27
frequency.
2

'Viz.,

the Fifth Circuit, as follows:

Howell Turpentine Co. v. Commissioner,

162 F.2d 319 (C. C. A. 5th 1947), wherein the appellate court reweighed the evidence
and gave credence to testimony which had failed to convince the Tax Court;
Commissioner v. Greenspun, 156 F.2d 917 (C. C. A. 5th 1946) (upon the taxpayer's
cross-appeal); Hughes v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 712 (C. C. A. 5th 1946); Hawkins

v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 221 (C. C. A. 5th 1945); Flowers v. Commissioner, 148
F.2d 163 (C. C. A. 5th 1945), rev'd, 326 U. S. 465, 66 Sup. Ct. 250, 90 L. Ed. 203
(1946); Court Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 823 (C. C. A. 5th (1944),

rev'd, 324 U. S. 331, 65 Sup. Ct. 707, 89 L. Ed. 981 (1945); Express Pub. Co.
v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 386 (C. C. A. 5th 1944); cf. Flick's Estate v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 733 (C. C. A. 5th 1948); Foran v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 705
(C. C. A. 5th 1948); Culbertson v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 979 (C. C. A. 5th 1948);
also the Sixth Circuit, with such reversals of the Tax Court as Woosley v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 330 (C. C. A. 6th 1948); Cleveland Allerton Hotel v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 805 (C. C. A. 6th 1948); Weizer v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d
772 (C. C. A. 6th 1948); Cronin v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 561 (C. C. A. 6th
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Obviously, the Dobson rule was not functioning as its architects seem
to have planned. It may well be granted that the circuit courts of appeals
did much to invite and provoke the Dobson ruling, by reweighing the
evidence and drawing a different inference from that of the Tax Court
in many cases where the inference which that tribunal drew was a
possible one. 2 8 The "mischief" was, indeed, there, but the remedy was
not practicable. Even the Supreme Court could not effectively confer
upon decisions of the Tax Court "greater immunity from review than
the decisions of other courts." ' 2 9 Confusion, uncertainty and lack of
uniformity in the application of the tax laws rapidly followed from the
30
attempt. And Dobson steadily shredded away.
Congress has now taken a hand by amending section 1141(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code. It thereby has made specific what it thought
it had clearly enough provided by section 1003(b) of the Revenue Act
of 1926.31 In a sense we are back where we started when appeals were
first authorized from the Board of Tax Appeals to the circuit courts of
appeals over two decades ago, but enlightened by experience. It now
lies with the circuit courts of appeals and the Supreme Court to give
effect to the legislative direction.

1947); Lawton v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 380 (C. C. A. 6th 1947); Tower v.
Commissioner. 148 F.2d 388 (C. C. A. 6th 1945) ; Central Natl. Bank v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 352 (1944) ; 1 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 106.
"'This is not to imply that the inferences and conclusions of fact which the Tax
Court drew were always correct. Far from it. The Tax Court probably did as
well in that respect as most United States district courts.
-"Commissioner v. National Carbide Corp, 167 F.2d 304, 307 (C. C A. 2nd
1948).
"See Frankel & Smith v. Commissioner, 167 F 2d 94, 96 (C. C. A. 2nd 1948):
"As we agree with the Tax Court, we do not consider whether its decision is within
so much of the doctrine of Dobson v. Coinmnissioner, k20 U S. 489, 64 Sup. Ct.
239, 88 L. Ed. 248, as still remains intact."
4

'See note 13 supra.
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